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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

COMMERCE PROPERTIES, INC., a
Utah corporation,
No. 890344-CA
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
F.W. CHAMP, G.H. CHAMP, and
MARY CHAMP NIELSEN, d/b/a
CHAMP ASSOCIATES,
Defendants-Respondents.

RESPONDENTS1 BRIEF

JURISDICTION
and
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Jurisdiction:

Appellant relies upon Utah Code Ann. 78-2-2 and

Rule 3 and 4A Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.

Respondents

believe that Utah Code Ann. 78-2a-3(2)(h) is applicable in
this case also.
Nature of Proceedings:

Respondents take issue with the

Appellant's Nature of Proceedings set forth in its brief and
asserts that the Appellant-Plaintiff's case was an action
founded on tortious interference with business interests, and
bad faith dealings of the Respondents-Defendants with regard
to the plaintiff.

Appellant in its statement of the case now

claims that this action is in the nature of a breach of
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contract which contention was specifically rejected by the
trial court as not pled and repeatedly objected to by the
Respondents as being outside of the scope of the pleadings.
This matter was tried on

Appellant's complaint and

the allegations and contentions contained therein before the
Court sitting without a jury.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
Respondents take the position that Appellant
is bound by the issues it claims are the issues of this
appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondents disagree with Appellant's Statement of
the Case and therefore set out their own statement.
1.

Plaintiff-appellant (Commerce herein) brought

an action against the defendants-respondents (collectively
Champs herein) asserting that Champs had not renewed a lease
and had tortiously interfered with the business relations
of Commerce; that the actions of Champs were in bad faith;
and that Champs' actions served no legitimate business purpose.
2. Champs had entered into a listing agreement with
Commerce to find a lessee for a tract of property owned by
Champs.

The listing agreement expired by its own terms, but

Commerce located a lessee who entered into a five year lease
with an option to extend the lease for an additional five
years if the tenant exercised its option by a date certain.
The lessee did not exercise its option. The lease expired and
-2-

subsequently the lessee negotiated a new lease with Champs.
Commerce brought this action against Champs claiming a
commission and asserting bad faith and tortious interference
with business interests.
3. The action was tried to the Court, sitting without
jury, upon the contentions of Commerce's complaint it not
having moved to amend its pleadings and after it rested, Champs
moved, under Rule 41(b), URCP, for a judgment of no cause of
action, which was granted by the Court.
4. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law were
made and entered by the Court. Commerce moved to amend them
but the motion was denied.

Commerce timely appealed to

the Supreme Court which referred this matter to the Court of
Appeals.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Commerce is a Utah corporation and a licensed

real estate brokerage firm.

(Finding of Fact No. 1, R-217,

Answer, R-39, TR-43).
(2)

Champs are the general partners of Champ

Associates, a Utah general partnership. (Findings of Fact No.
2, R-217, TR-43).
3.

In 1981, Champs engaged Commerce to find a lessee

for a tract of real property that Champs owned which was
located in Salt Lake County (Findings of Fact No. 3, R-217, R
-4, 29). Commerce eventually found a lessee, Dick Morrison
Tire Company (Morrison herein) which entered into a five year
lease on the property. (Finding of Fact No. 4, R-217).
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The Lease contained a provision that Morrison

had an option to extend the lease for an additional five (5)
year term, provided that Morrison exercised the option in
writing on or before October 1, 1986.

(Finding of Fact No. 5,

R-217, 218, Lease, R-7, 14, 19, Answer, R-9).
5.

Champs paid Commerce the agreed upon commission

for the five year lease which amounted to $17,820.00. (Finding
of Fact No. 6, R-218, TR-44), and agreed to pay an additional
commission if the lessee exercised the 5 year option to extend
the original
6.

5 year lease (Par 5, R-5).
When the five year term was coming to a close,

Wint Champ, one of the Champs, went the the owner of Morrison,
Mr. Robert Morrison, in June of 1986, and asked him if he was
going to exercise the option (TR-97, Deposition, Morrison, p.
6, 7—admitted into evidence by stipulation, TR-26). Mr.
Morrison stated that he was not sure if he was going to renew
the lease. Mr. Morrison told the same thing to Mr. Lott, who
was one of the principal officers of Commerce. (Deposition,
Morrison, p. 7).
7.

prior to the October 1, 1986 dead-line for

exercising the option Mr. Morrison testified that he was
looking at other properties to lease and might move his
business (Deposition, Morrison, p. 7, 9).
8.
the option,

Mr. Morrison testified that he did not exercise
and that he told Wint Champs and Lott that he was

not going to exercise the option (Deposition, Morrison, pp. 7,

-4-

11).

9.

After the October 1, 1986 deadline Champs had

their then legal counsel send a letter to Morrison advising it
that the lease was terminated as of the end of the lease term
due to the fact that the option had not been exercised
(Finding (Finding of Fact No. 9, R-218, TR 20, 40).
10.

Thereafter, in November and December, 1986,

Morrison negotiated with Champs for a new lease, (TR 74) and
obtained the concessions that it wanted in the new lease
(Deposition, Morrison, p. 15, 16).
11.

On January 6, 1987, after the termination of

the old lease on December 31, 1986, (R-7) Morrison entered
into a new Lease with Champs.

(Finding of Fact No. 10, R-218,

R-40).
12.

Commerce made demand upon Champs to pay a

commission on the new lease, based upon the old commission
agreement (Exhibit 4) which demand was rejected by Champs
(TR-45) and
13.

Commerce commenced the instant suit.
Commerce asserted that Champs had "tortiously

interfered with the business interests of plaintiff"
(complaint, par 9, R-03) and had "in bad faith" for "no
business purpose other than to avoid" the payment of a
commission to Commerce (Complaint, par 8, R-3) manipulated
Champs tenant relationship with Morrison by sending the
notice of cancellation (Complaint, par 6, R-3,TR-64).
14.

Morrison, however, testified that Champ

urged him to renew the old lease (Deposition, Morrison,

p. 14, TR-56) but Morrison was exercising his business
judgment in not renewing it as he wanted a better deal.
(Deposition, Morrision, pp. 14, 15).
15.

The Court affirmatively found that there

was no evidence of bad faith on the part of Champs (Findings
of Fact No. 12, R-219); that Champs had not caused Morrison
not to exercise its option for the second five year term
(Findings of Fact No. 11, R-218, 219); or any evidence
that showed that Champs had no legitimate business purpose
in refusing to extend the original lease (Findings of Fact
No. 13, R-219); further, no evidence was introducted to show
that Champs acted tortiously or interfered with the business
interests of Commerce (Findings of Fact No. 14, R-219).
16.

Commerce introduced no instrument in

writing that was a viable contract, still in force and
effect, that provided for the award of attorney's
fees

(Findings of Fact No. 18, R-220).
17.

Commerce did not move to amend its pleadings

at anytime before, during or after the trial to assert a claim
under a contract theory or any other theory, other than that
asserted in the complaint (Findings of Fact No. 15 and 16,
R-219) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. Commerce has failed to show any error on the part
of the trial court or to cite where in the record
the trial court erred. Commerce failed to
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properly marshal the facts and reference the
record thereto.
2.

Champs are entitled to sanctions, the award
of attorney's fees and double costs.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
COMMERCE FAILED TO MAKE A CONCISE
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS IN
CONFORMITY WITH RULE 24, RULES
OF UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Commerce in its brief has failed to set forth the
facts that were proven with citations to the record as is
mandated by Rule 24 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.
Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 746 P.2d 1182 (Utah App.
1987) .
It is conceded that Commerce has set forth some
facts and has given citations therefor, but not those found
by the court amd entered as the Findings of Fact. Commerce has
merely reasserted its theory upon which it tried the case and
lost.
Commerce studiously omitted from its recitation of
the facts any reference to the Findings of Fact made by the
trial court, or to one of the most important facts which is
controlling over Commercefs theory, that is:

The original

lease had a mandatory option clause which had to be exercised
if the lease was to be extended for an additional five years,
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which option was not exercised by the lessee in spite of the
urgings of Champs to the lessee to exercise the option.
Commerce in its recitation of the facts has made
reference to matters which were not received in evidence
by the Court, such as answers to interrogatories

and

an affidavit of Commerce's attorney, which was not even
tendered to the Court. (R-lll, 114).

POINT TWO
COMMERCE FAILED TO POINT OUT
WHERE THE COURT ERRED IN RULING
AS IT DID OR RULED CONTRARY TO
THE EVIDENCE
Commerce in its brief merely parrots what it espoused
at the time of trial.
Commerce claims that the first issue on appeal is
that the trial court failed to apply Utah law with respect
to a broker being entitled to a commission on a "lease
renewal".
It is respectfully submitted that Commerce must
show that the lease was in fact renewed.
The trial court in its Findings of Fact held that
the option to extend the lease was not exercised (R-218)
and thus the old lease was not renewed.
Findings of Fact, whether based on oral testamony or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous. Porter v. Groover, 734 P.2d 465 (Utah 1987); Rule

52 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended effective
January 1, 1987; See: "Standard of Review", set out in T. R.
F.v. Felan, 760 P.2d 906 (Utah App. 1988).
After Champs argued their Rule 41(b) URCP motion and
after Commerce had responded thereto, the Court observed:
" . . . but based upon the testimony that the
Court has heard, it would appear that there was
a new lease that was signed. The old lease was
never extended. Notice time expired, and the
evidence shows there was a new lease that was
prepared. Although many of the provisions were
the same, there were many provisions that had some
differences in there. And based on the testimony
there was serious negotiations in terms of
renegotiation the new lease." (TR 114, 115)
The Court went on and stated:
"Because the evidence shows that there was
a new lease, that there was no renewal, . . "
They did not renew their lease and the new
lease was entered into by the parties." (TR-115)
Commerce in asserting its claimed issue, must show
that there was a renewal of the lease.

To do this, it must

show that the Findings of the Court were in error.
It has failed to do this. It is an appellant's
burden to show that the evidence in the record does not
substantiate the findings of the court. General Glass Corp v.
Mast Construct Co., 766 P.2d 429 (Utah App. 1988).
The Supreme Court in the case of Scharf v. BMG Corp.,
700 P.2d 1068 (Utah, 1985) stated:
"To mount a successful attack on the
trial court's findings of fact, an
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appellant must marshal all the evidence
in suport of the trial court's findings
and then demonstrate that even viewing it
in the light most favorable to the court
below, the evidence is insufficient to
support the findings. (citing authority)
"Nowhere does he marshal the evidence
supporting his version of the facts,
much less the evidence supporting the
trial court's findings. Under these
circumstances, we decline to further
consider Erickson's attack on the
factual findings."
To the same effect see:

Power Sys. & Controls v. Keith's

Elec., 765 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1988).
These cases are dispositive of the second issue
raised by Commerce in its brief (p. 2 thereof), that the trial
court erred in not construing the facts most favorable to
Commerce.
Commerce seems to fail to recognize that a full trial
was conducted.

Evidence was received.

Testimony was heard.

Commerce put on everything that it had but it failed to
meet its burden of proving anything that would afford it any
legal recourse against the Champs.
the burden of proof.

In short it did not meet

Had this been a motion heard under Rule

12 (b), URCP, then the weight would be with the opposing
party, but here plaintiff tried its case and did not meet its
burden of proof.

As a matter of law it is not entitled to

a preference on construing the facts most favorable to the
plaintiff.
Rule 41(b) URCP is very specific about the matter of
a dismissal after the plaintiff has put on its evidence.
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Justice Durham pointed out in Lemon v. Coates,
735 P.2d 58 (Utah 1987):
"Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b)
is appropriately applied when the
trial judge finds that the claimant
has either failed to make out a prima
facie case or when the trial judge is
not persuaded by the evidence presented
by the claimant".
Commerce has not raised the propriety of the
Court granting the Rule 41 (b) motion except to assert
that the court did not apply law correctly. Commerce
makes no reference to the record to establish the
conditions upon which the law, if it is in fact the law,
would be applied.

It asserts that there was a lease

renewal, but cites nothing from the record that shows
that there was such a renewal.

It asserts that Commerce

procured a lessee, but makes no reference to the record to
show that Commerce procured a lessee for the new lease, or
that Champs accepted the lessee that Commerce procured for
the new lease.
The old lease expired by its terms and as pointed
out in Cottonwood Mall Co., v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499 (Utah 1988)
when a written lease terminates by its own terms at the
expiration date and is not renewed by the parties, the courts
cannot renew it for them.
POINT THREE
COMMERCE HAS NOT SHOWN THAT THE
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TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONSTRUE
THE FACTS MOST FAVORABLE TO
COMMERCE IN GRANTING CHAMPS MOTION
TO DISMISS
Commerce asserts that it is entitled to have
the Court construe the facts in a light most favorable to
it.

It relies upon three Utah cases. However, these

cases speak to who is to have the evidence weighted in their
favor during the appellate process, not at the trial level.
Commerce cites Davis v. Payne & Day, Inc., 10 Utah
2d 53, 348 P.2d 337 (1960). Reliance upon this case is
misplaced in that no Findings of Fact were made by the trial
court in Davis, which is not the case now before the Court.
Judge Uno made extensive Findings (R-216-220).
Another case cited by Commerce was Lawrence v.
Bamburger R. R, 3 Utah 2d 247, 282 P. 2d 335 (1955).

It is

respectfully submitted that Commerce's reliance on this case
is again misplaced in that this case when read in its
entirety, is contrary to the contentions of Commerce.
Justice Crockett in Lawrence v. Bamburger, pointed
out that were the trial court made Findings of Fact, the
appellate court had the duty to review the evidence in the
light most favorable to the Findings of Fact made by the
trial court, and that those Findings will not be disturbed
unless the "appellant meets his burden of affirmatively
showing error." Accord: Child v. Hayward, 16 Utah 2d 351,
400 P.2d 758 (1965); Petty v. Gindy Manufacturing Corporation,
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17 Utah 2d 32, 404 P.2d 30 (1965); Petrie v. General
Contracting Company, 17 Utah 2d 408, 413 P.2d 600 (1966);
Great Salt Lake M & C Corp v. Arthur G. McKee & CO, 539 P.
2d 371 (Utah 1975) .
POINT FOUR
COMMERCE WAS NOT ENTITLED
TO THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S
FEES UNDER ANY THEORY
Commerce raises as the third issue presented upon
appeal, that of it being entitled to the award of
attorney's fees.
Before Commerce would have been entitled to any
attorney's fees, it would have had to be the prevailing
party.

It was not.
Before Commerce would have been entitled to

any attorney's fees, it had to show that such entitlement
was based upon a contract or upon a statute. B. R. Supply Co.
v. J. M. Bringhurst, 503 P.2d 1216 (Utah, 1972);

Turtle

Management, Inc v. Haggis Management, 645 P.2d 667 (Utah,
1982) .
Commerce asserts that the written contract that
entitled it to attorney's fees was the listing agreement
(Exhibit 1).
This document states on its face that it expired
on March 31, 1981 (TR-24) and was only conditionally
accepted by the Court as admitted evidence (TR-24), over
the objection of Champs.
The document having expired, there was no contract
-13-

or writing upon which attorney's fees could be awarded.
Commerce did not put on any evidence as to
attorney' fees, or the reasonableness or the value of the same
during its presentation of its case, (TR-111, 114) nor did it
make a formal motion to reopen.
The amount of attorney's fees can only be
proven by sworn testimony which is subject to cross
examination.
POINT FIVE
THE COURT CANNOT CREATE A NEW
CONTRACT FOR COMMERCE
Commerce in its brief urges the Court to take the
expired and cancelled listing agreement and intergrate its
terms and conditions into the commission agreement that was
executed by the parties and under which Champs paid Commerce
the commission for the five year term of the lease.
The listing agreement states on its face that it
was to expire on the 31st of March, 1981 which was some months
before Commerce found a lessee and the lessee, Dick Morrison
Tire Company executed the lease. (Exhibit No. 1)
Commerce cites no authority for this approach to
contract law.

The one case that it does cite Gregerson v.

Jensen, 617 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980) stands for the proposition
that several documents may be construed together to get around
the statute of frauds bar in the sale of real property and the
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granting of a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence,
neither being applicable in the instant case.
POINT SIX
COMMERCE INTRODUCED NO EVIDENCE
THAT ESTABLISHED THAT A TEN YEAR
LEASE WAS ENTERED INTO
Commerce predicates its entire factual scenerio upon
the proposition that it procured a lessee who executed a ten
year lease and thus the Champs owed the commission for the
second five year term.
This theory is flawed in that the lease agreement
was for a five year term which expired on December 31, 1986.
Not ten years, but five years.
The lessee had the option to extend or renew
the lease for an additioal five years, and had it done so,
there is no dispute about Champs owing a commission for the
renewed period.
The Lease Agreement,

paragraph 48, states:

"The option to renew this lease shall
be exercised by written notice delivered by
the tenant to the landlord on or before
October 1, 1986."
The tenant did not exercise the option to renew.
The "Commission Agreement", Exhibit " 2 " , paragraph
3, expressly states:
"In the event the term of the Lease shall
be extended pursuant to the provisions of
paragraph 48 of the Lease, the commission
payable . . . . "
Paragraph 4 of the same instrument recites:

-15-

"Date of Payment
Upon receipt of written notice
of the exercise of the option
to renew."
No extension occured and no receipt of the
required written notice was made.
Clearly the written notice of exercising the
option was a condition precedent to any agreement for the
payment of any commission.
In the early case of Associated Inv. Co. v Cayias,
185 P. 778 (1920), the Utah court adopted the definition of
a condition precedent as found in

6 Ruling Case Law § 290

which is:
"Condition precedent call for the performance
of some act or the happening of some event
after a contract is entered into and upon the
performance or happening of which its
obligations are made to depend."
Commerce does not attack the findings of the Court
which found that the option had not been exercised. (Findings
of Fact, No. 8f R-218) or the Conclusions of Law, Nos. 1 and
2, R-220).
POINT SEVEN
COMMERCE COULD NOT PREVAIL UNDER ANY
THEORY OF LAW BASED UPON THE FACTS OF
THIS CASE
Commerce based its complaint upon tortious
interference with business opportunity and acts in bad faith
which caused Morrison not to renew the old lease. (TR-18, 19).
At no time did it seek to amend its pleadings, under Rule 15,
-16-

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or any other applicable Rule.
Defendant, time and time again, objected to any contract
theory being injected into the case. (TR 12-24, 25, 34, 35,
49, 51, 54, 60, 63, 100, 107.

The Court tried the matter on

plaintiff's complaint. (TR-4; Conclusion of Law No. 3, R220) .
The totality of plaintiff's appellate plea is to
reassert what it argued below.
the evidence.

It does not marshal the

It makes no reference to the facts of the

entire record or those facts which were material to the
Court's Findings of Fact.

It does not assert that it proved

any elements pled in its complaint which the trial court
found had no merit.
As pointed out in O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306
(Utah App. 1987):
Defendant's claims on appeal simply
controvert the findings of the Court.
The Claims are not only without merit
but also without basis in law or fact.
Plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of
Rule 33(a)
Bad faith need not be shown, Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d
395 (Utah App. 1987); O'Brien, supra., however, the appellant
must show something other than that asserted below or some
error of the lower court.
Commerce is asserting that it is Utah law, even
though the contract between the parties does not so state,
that once a real estate broker locates a tenant, the landlord
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is liable for a commission to the real estate broker, even
though the legal relationship between the tenant and landlord
ceases by the written terms of their agreement, if the tenant
and landlord subsequently, without any collusion, fraud or
wrongdoing between them, enter into a new arrangement.
Commerce cites no authority for this theory of law.

Two New

York cases, are cited by Commerce, which on their facts, are
not applicable to this case.

Commerce put on no

evidence whatsoever to show that there was collusion or some
sort of arrangment between Champs and Morrison, nor did it
plead such in its complaint.
Commerce asserts:
" . . the Champs should not be allowed
to unilaterally manipulate the lease
extension documents. . ."
(Emphasis ours, Appellant's brief, p. 22.
This is not a breach of contract claim as there must
be two parties to an enforceable contract.
Law, Contracts, 2nd § 9.;

Restatement of the

One cannot contract with himself.

A conspiracy was not pled nor proved. Generally
a civil conspiracy requires a combination of two or more
persons who by some concerted action want to accomplish some
criminal or unlawful purpose, or to injure another. 16 Am.
Jur. 2d 267, Conspiracy, § 49. Nothing in the evidence
shows that Champs and Morrison got together and entered into
an arrangement whereby Morrison did not exercise its option.
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No law has been cited by Commerce that makes it
actionable to exercise one's legal rights. To the contrary,
the law of Utah is clear that it is not a breach of contract
to do an act which a person has a legal right to do.
Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597 (1962);
Ted R. Brown and Assoc, v. Carnes Corp.,

753 P.2d 964

(Utah App. 1988) .
Commerce put on no proof to establish that
the predominant or any purpose of Champ's act in sending the
notice that the lease would terminate by reason of the
failure of Morrision to exercise its option was to hurt
or injure Commerce.

Leigh Furniture and Carpet v. Isom,

637 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982) .
Commerce could have inserted language into the
commission agreement (exhibit 4) to protect its self
if the Champs entered into an new lease with Morrison
but it did not, and the Court should not insert that
language into a contract for it. The Courts will not relieve
a party of a bad bargain. Bray Lines Inc. v. Utah Carriers,
Inc., 739 P.2d 1115 (Utah App. 1987); Hal Taylor Associates v.
Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743 (Utah 1982).

POINT EIGHT
COMMERCE'S RELIANCE ON THE NEW YORK CASES
CITED ARE MISPLACED
Commerce cites New York case law for the
proposition that

Commerce was entitled to a commission.
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A reading of these cases clearly and undeniably
demonstates the
reason why

meritless nature of this appeal and the

Champs are entitled to the award of attorney's

fees and double costs.
Commerce relies upon Mullen & Woods, Inc. v. 615 West
57th Street, Inc., 146 Misc. 599, 262 N.Y.S. 467 (1933) at
page

14 of its brief.

This case states:

"In the absence of special agreement, the
plaintiff would not be entitled to
commissions on subsequent extensions of
which it was not the procuring cause."
Emphasis ours.

The Court then reversed the judgment in

favor of the real estate broker and entered a judgment
against it of no cause of action.
Commerce asserts the holdings of Allwin Realty Co v.
Barth, 146 N.Y.S. 960 (1914) at page 14 of its brief supports
its position. This case is practically on all fours,
factually, with the instant case.

In that case there was a

lease with an option to the lessee to extend, provided he did
so, in writing, by a specified time.

The lessee did not

exercise the option and subsequently entered into a new lease
with the defendant, landlord.

Plaintiff, the broker, sued

and the New York Court reversed a judgment in his favor.

The

third head-note of the reported case, succintly capsulates
the case and states:
"Even if that contract was enforceable, the
broker was not entitled to any commission,
where tenant failed to exercise its option at
the time specified, but did take a new lease
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with different provisions after considerable
negotiations with the principal."
The appellate Court observed:
"The tenant, however, refused to exercise
the option, and the right to an extended
term of the lease expired and was at an
end. The parties were then at liberty
to make a new lease or to make whatever
disposition of the property their interests
required." (p. 963)
The Court then reversed the judgment that the lower court
had awarded the broker.
The third case cited by Commerce, Rosenfeld Realty
Company v. Cadence Industries Corporation, 75 Misc.2d 634,
348 N.Y.S.2d 523 (1973) is, on its facts is entirely
distinguishable from the instant case.

In Rosenfeld, the

Court pointed out that the landlord had deliberately,
intentionally and willfully terminated the sub-lease which
was the basis for the payment of the commission (p. 527 of
N.Y.S. citation).
New York adopts the same rationale as other states
that a commission is payable only if it was procured through
the services of the

Broker. Bass Inv. Co. V. Banner Realty,

Inc., 428 P.2d 142 (Ariz. App. 1967) vacated on other grounds
436 P.2d 894; Hiniger v. Jody, 194 Kan. 155, 398 P.2d 305
(1965); Record Realty, Inc., v. Hull, 15 Wash App. 826,
552 P.2d 191 (1976) .
Utah, by strong dicta in Patterson v. Blair, 123 Utah
16, 257 P.2d 944 (1953), follows the other states in holding
that a commission claimed by a broker is for service
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rendered.

It rejected the plea of a broker who claimed that

it was entitled to a commission where property was sold to
someone it had casually mentioned to as being available,
sometime after the listing agreement ran out.
Commerce asserts that the lease between the Champs
and Morrison was renewed, a fact that was expressly rejected
by the trial court.

Commerce cites nothing in the record

that refutes this finding.
Its reliance on case law dealing with actions
predicated upon a renewal of an existing lease is misplaced
and serves no valid purpose in this appeal.
Commerce seems to be injecting, for the first time
on appeal, the claim that there was a confidential or
fiduciary duty between Champs on the one hand and Commerce
on the other, and to this end cites Hawkins v. Perry, 123 Utah
16, 253 P.2d 372 (1953).

A reading of this case discloses

that, factually, it is completely remote from the instant
case, but to the contrary, it asserts what has to be shown
to establish a confidential or fiduciary relationship between
persons.

The case deals with the imposition of a constructive

trust upon a piece of property which had been purchased, with
a boy's money, by a relative.
Commerce did not plead a confidential relationship
between Champs and Commerce, or that there was a fiduciary
duty arising between Champs and Commerce.

It need no citation

of law to assert that matters will not be entertained on
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appeal that were not raised below. In any event there is, by
law, no fiduciary duty running from a principal to a broker.
Hal Taylor Associates v. Unionamerica, Inc. Supra.
Commerce asserts at page 20 of its brief that it
would not have expended efforts in subleasing part of the
property had it known that it would not have been paid a
commission.

No reference is given to the record to

establish this assertion, again, first raised on appeal.
But, to the contrary, Commerce was paid a commission
for arranging the sublease to the post office (TR-28).
POINT NINE
CHAMPS ARE ENTITLED TO SANCTIONS
AND THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IN
THIS APPELLATE PROCEDURE
Champs request the Appellate Court, pursuant to
Rule 33 (a), Rules of the Court of Appeals, to award double
costs and attorney's fees, in this matter.
It is obvious, from the issues raised, the references
to the record, or lack of the same, the law claimed to have
been erroneously applied, that the appeal of Commerce is
frivolous and for delay in the finalizing this matter.
There is no legal or factual basis for this appeal.
It is a continuation of the assertion of theories not plead,
proven or founded upon any law recognized in Utah or
elsewhere.
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As pointed out in Porco v. Porco/ 752 P.2d 365 (Utah
App. 1988) sanctions will be applied where an appeal is
obviously without any merit and has been taken with little or
no reasonable likelihood of prevailing.
CONCLUSION
Appellant, Commerce's, appeal should be
summarily rejected, the trial court's decision affirmed
and this matter remanded to the trial court for determination
of Respondent, Champs', attorney fees and the award for double
costs.
Dated this 18th day of August, 1989.

IRENE WARR
Attorneys for Respondents
Suite 280, 311 South State
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

ORIGINAL SIGNED FOR COURT
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
A*? ^k
This is to certify that on the ft* day of August,
1989, the undersigned caused the required number of
Respondents' Brief to be served upon the Appellant by
hand delivery to:
Marcus G. Theodore, Esq.
Attorney at Law
275 East South Temple, Suite 303
Salt Lake City, Utp*rB>lll

LS

ORIGINAL SIGNED FOR COURT
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
COMMERCE PROPERTIES, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

i

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
i
F. W. CHAMP, G. H. CHAMP and
MARY CHAMP NIELSEN d/b/a
)
CHAMP ASSOCIATES,

Civil No. C 8802446
Judge Raymond S. Uno

Defendants.
The above entitled matter came on for trial before
the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, District Judge, sitting without a
jury, on the 17th day of February, 1989, the plaintiff
appearing through one of its corporate employees and being
represented by its attorney, Marcus G. Theodore, Esq.., and the
defendants appearing by and through one of its general
partners, F. W. (Winton) Champ, and being represented by their
attorneys, Paul N. Cotro-Manes, Esq., and

Irene Warr, Esq.,

and the Court having taken testimony and received evidence and
the plaintiff having rested its case and the defendants having
made a motion to dismiss for failure of the plaintiffs to prove
a claim upon which relief could be granted based upon the
record and evidence adduced by it, and the parties having
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submitted written memoranda to the Court,and the Court being
fully advised in the premises, now makes its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Plaintiff is a corporation duly licnesed

by the State of Utah to act as a real estate broker and salesman.
2.

The Defendant, Champ Associates, is a general

partnership, doing business in the State of Utah and that the
individual named defendants are its general partners.
3.

The defendant, Champ Associates, ownes certain

real property in Salt Lake County and in 1981 it desired to
lease said property and retained the services of the plaintiff
to find a lessee for said property. The defendant and
plaintiff entered into a written contract which provided for
certain commissions to be paid plaintiff in the event that it
procured a lessee for the defendant.
4.

A lessee was located by the plaintiff and a five

year lease was entered into by the defendant and Dick
Morrison Tire Co., Inc., which lease was to run to December 31,
1986.
5.

The lease agreement and a subsequent

agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant, Champ
Associates, provided that the lessee was given an option to
extend the lease with the defendant for an additional five year
term, but to do so the lessee had to exercise this option by a
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written notice which had to be given before October 1, 1986•
6.

If the option was exercised by the Lessee

before October 1, 1986, the defendant, Champ Associates, agreed
to pay plaintiff an additional real estate commission of
$17,820.00 under the terms and manner as specified in the
Commission Agreement dated August 6, 1981 (Exhibit No. 4).
7.

Prior to October 1, 1986, the lessee through its

principal officer, Robert Morrison, decided not to exercise
the option to extend the lease for an additional five year
term.

He was looking at other properties,and also wanted to be

able to extract concessions from the defendant in a new lease.
8.

Lessee, Dick Morrison Tire Company, Inc., did not

exercise its option to extend the existing lease with the
defendant.
9.

Defendant, Champ Associastes, caused its attorney

to send a notice on October 31, 1986 to the lessee, Dick
Morrison Tire Co., Inc., advising it that its rights to extend
the lease under the option contained therein, had expired by
reason of its failure to give written notice of the exercising
of said option by October 1, 1986.
10.

That thereafter the defendant and Robert

Morrision entered into negotiations for a new lease of the
same property, which culimated in the defendant and Dick
Morrision Tire Co., executing a new five year lease on January
6, 1987.
11.

Plaintiff introduced no evidence or testimony
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that the defendant or any of its general partners or anyone
else caused Dick Morrison Tire Co., Inc., not to exercise its
option to extend the original lease for the additional five
year term.
12.

Plaintiff introduced no evidence or testimony

that the defendants acted in bad faith in sending the notice of
October 31, 1986 advising the lessee, Dick Morrison Tire Co.,
Inc., that its option had exprired; further there was no
evidence or testimony showing any bad faith on the part of
the defendants with respect the entire transaction between
the defendants, the lessee, or the plaintiff.
13.

Plaintiff introducted no evidence or testimony

evidencing that the defendants had no legitimate business
purpose in refusing to extend the original lease or of
entering into negotiations with Dick Morrison Tire Co., Inc.,
for a new lease of the property, or of entering into a new
lease of the property on January 6, 1987.
14.

Plaintiff introduced no evidence or testimony

evidencing that the defendants acted tortiously or interferred
with the business interests of plaintiff by actions which were
contrary to law.
15.

Plaintiff did not move the Court to allow it

to amend its pleadings either before, during or after trial.
16.

Defendants during the course of the entire trial

timely objected to any attempts of the plaintiff to go beyond
the scope of its pleadings.
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17.

Plaintiff put on no sworn testimony with respect

to attorney's fees, but relied upon an affidavit of its
attorney filed by him in conjunction with a previous motion.
18.

The Commission Agreement (Exhibit 4) makes no

reference to attorney's fees.
Based upon the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT the Court
now makes its CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Even if this matter had been plead as an action

founded upon a contract between the plaintiff and the
defendants, the original Sales Agency Agreement was merged as a
matter of law into the Commission Agreement of August 6, 1981.
As a condition precedent to any commission for the extension of
the existing lease being due and payable to the plaintiff by
the defendant, the lessee had to timely give written notice of
its intention

to extend the existing lease for an additional

five year term.
2.

Lessee failed to give notice, either written or

oral, of its intention to extend the the existing lease. As a
matter of law the condition precedent was not fufilled, and
the plaintiff failed in its burden of proof of establishing a
cause of action, founded upon contract.
3.

Plaintiff as a matter of law is bound by its

pleadings, and as no motion was made to amend those pleadings,
and as the issues of contract were timely objected to by the
defendant throughout the entire trial of this matter, the
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Court concludes that even if the plaintiff had moved to amend
its pleadings to conform to the evidence, the Court would be
within its discretion to deny such a motion.
4.

Plaintiff as a matter of law did not sustain its

burden of showing that the defendants acted in bad faith in
this matter, or that they did not have a legitimate business
purpose in not extending the existing lease after the time
had run for exercising the option to extend the lease for an
additional five year term, or that the defendants acted
tortiously or interferred with the business interests of the
plaintiff by conduct that was contrary to the laws of Utah.
5.

The Court concludes that the plaintiff failed to

prove a claim upon which relief could be granted and that,
therefore, defendants1 motion was well taken and should be
granted.
Let Judgment be entered accordingly.
DATED this/£_Lday of *Cbi«ua'ry, 1989.

BY THE COURT:

y£^*~*
District Judge

-6-

(\(\0:>? I

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on the/D

th day of February,

1989, the undersigned caused a copy of the foregoing Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law to be served upon the plaintiff
by depositing a copy of the same into the United States Mail,
postage prepaid and addressed to:
Marcus G. Theodore, Esq.
Attorney at Law
275 East South Temple, Suite 303
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
These Findings and Conclusions are forwarded to the
above party pursuant to Rule 4.504, Rules of Judicial
Administration and any objection as to said Findings and
Conclusions should be made within five (5) days of date of
service.
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RULES OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Rule 24. Briefs.
(a) Brief of appellant The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate headings and in the order here indicated:
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or
agency whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where
the caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties.
The list should be set out on a separate page which appears immediately
inside the cover.
(2) A table of contents with page references.
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with
parallel citations, agency rules, court rules, statutes, and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are cited.
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of this court and describing the nature of the proceedings below.
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review.
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose interpretation is determinative, set out verbatim with the
appropriate citation. If a pertinent part of a quotation is lengthy, the
citation alone will suffice, and in that event, the provision shall be set
forth as provided in Paragraph (f) of this rule.
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly
the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, amd its disposition in the
court below. There shall follow a statement of the facts relevant to the
issues presented for review. All statements of fact and references to the
proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record (see Paragraph (3)).
(8) A summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably
paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually
made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the
heading under which the argument is arranged.
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions of the
appellant with' respect to the issues presented and the reasons therefor,
with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied
on.
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RULES OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery
of attorney fees.
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. If the court determines that
a motion made or an appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous or for
delay, it shall award just damages and single or double costs, including reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party.
(b) Disciplinary action for inadequate representation. The court may
impose appropriate sanctions against any counsel who inadequately represents a client on appeal.

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 52

Rule 52. Findings by the court.
(a) Effect In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59
when the motion is based on more than one ground.
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